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THE RANGE SAFETY PROBLEM 
"A THORN IN THE FLESH"
J. R. Duffett 
J. N. Thi Iges
TRW Systems Florida Operations
Introduct ion
The range safety problem is truly "a 
thorn in the flesh" to the user of the 
missile test ranges. The range user has 
one objective in mind: to get his missile 
off the ground and successfully complete 
his test objectives. Any thing that inter­ 
feres with that objective is, to him, an 
evil he can do without. Range Safety has 
often been considered such an evil - albeit 
a necessary one. Possibly a misunderstanding 
of the problem is the basis for this feeling. 
This paper endeavors to present the problem 
in its proper perspective by defining the 
problem and presenting the means used by the 
Range Safety Division of the ranges to assess, 
control and/or eliminate the risks involved 
in a missile flight. It starts by describing 
a typical flight, defines the problem, des­ 
cribes how the problem is controlled, and how 
it is qualitatively measured.
This paper is limited to flight safety, 
i.e., that period which commences with lift­ 
off of the missile. Pad safety and ground 
safety (e.g., propellant handling) are not 
d i scussed.
The discussions herein are general in­ 
sofar as possible. When it becomes necessary 
to be specific, examples are chosen from the 
AFETR, since we are more familiar with the 
operating procedures and philosophies of that 
range. They are, however, typical of all U.S. 
test ranges.
We have tried throughout this report to 
differentiate between range safety as a function 
of the range, and Range Safety as a personi­ 
fication of that function in the Range Safety 
Division by means of capital letters.
The Range Safety Problem
A typical missile flight can be divided 
into two parts, viz., a powered flight portion 
and a "free" flight or non-powered portion. 
Range Safety is primarily concerned with the 
powered flight portion, since usually only this 
portion can be controlled by the range safety 
function of the range. Figure 1 pictorializes 
a typical successful orbital flight from the 
AFETR.
An orbital flight was chosen since it 
better presents the dilemma facing the test 
range. The range is faced with the choice of 
not permitting the flight, or of permitting it 
to overfly inhabited land, both distasteful 
from Range Safety's viewpoint.
In Figure 1, the powered flight terminates 
with injection into orbit of the payload and 
the final stage. Since this "typical" launch 
vehicle consisted of three stages, the impact 
locations of the preceding two stages are also 
shown. The dotted line traversing the surface 
of the earth below the missile trajectory is 
the Instantaneous Impact Point (IIP). The IIP 
is defined as that point on the surface of the 
earth where the missile would impact if missile 
thrust were terminated at any instant ("now") 
during the powered portion of flight. Thus, for 
a ballistic type missile the instantaneous 
impact point at the time of computed engine shut­ 
down corresponds to the target. The HP does not 
correspond to the instantaneous sub-missile point 
(the intersection of the vertical from the missile 
with the surface of the earth) except during the 
vertical rise portion of powered flight. The 
velocity of the IIP will vary exponentially from 
0 feet per second during vertical rise to several 
hundred miles per second at burnout of a ballistic 
missile, to essentially infinity at injection 
into orbit of an orbital vehicle, at which point 
the IIP "vanishes" or leaves the surface of the 
earth. The progressions of the IIP and sub- 
missile point during a typical ballistic missile 
powered flight are also shown in Figure 2.
Obviously, a successful flight as shown In 
Figure 1 presents no problem. But a failed missile 
may. The problem presented to Range Safety Is how 
can life and property be adequately 
a malfunctioning, or failed missile, If It can­ 
not be, what are the risks involved? Safety 
has the responsibility of protecting the launch 
area and the downrange land areas. For the ETR, 
launch area has been defined as the Cape Kennedy 
launch complex and contiguous areas, down range 
as the islands and continents lying under or 
adjacent to the flight of the missile. One 
obvious means of protecting downrange areas is 
prohibiting any flight of a multistage vehicle 
in which any stage impacts on or near land masses 
if the flight is a success, this Is done.
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Another method is prohibiting over­ 
flight if it can be avoided without 
seriously compromising test objectives, and 
this is occasionally done. This can be 
accomplished by maneuvers during powered flight, 
for instance. Another means of protection is 
the termination of thrust of an errant missile.
Determination of Failure
Before the Range Safety Officer terminates 
a flight, he must assure himself that the missile 
is in fact in a failed condition. To do so, he 
must rely on different types of equipment which 
indicate incipient or developed failures. These 
equipments are of two general types, viz., optical 
and electrical (or electronic), as shown in 
Figure 3^ Different types of equipment are used 
during different portions of powered flight owing 
to the differing requirements and inherent 
limitations of the equipments.
Optical equipments are the primary instru­ 
mentation used during the lift-off, vertical 
rise, and programming of the missile. These 
consist of vertical wire sky screens and an 
observer, to determine that the missile does not 
deviate from allowable variations during lift off, 
vertical rise, and pitch over, and from the flight 
azimuth after completion of the pitch program. 
This system has obvious limitations. It is there­ 
fore supplemented by the telemetry electronic sky 
screen equipment (telemetry ELSSE). This system 
uses phase comparison of the telemetry carrier 
frequency from two sites to measure variations 
from the planned azimuth and pitch program, and 
presents these variations, together with per­ 
missible limitations, on strip charts. A recent 
innovation has been the presentation of missile 
rates (pitch, yaw, and roll) as measured and 
monitored by telemetry on strip charts to indi­ 
cate incipient failures. Since this system 
reveals failures before they are obvious on the 
other systems, it has become known as an antici­ 
patory system, since It allows the Range Safety 
0 ff i cer to anticipate the re s u 1 1 s of the fa I 1u re, 
as opposed to the other systems which can be con­ 
sidered confirmatory systems, since they confirm 
that a failure has indeed occurred* All of these 
systems at present rely upon a Range Safety 
Observer to read and analyze the data, and present 
the results orally to the Range Safety Officer.
The radar systems use position measuring 
radars to locate and track the missile in flight. 
These may be pulsed radars such as the FPS-16, 
or continuous wave radars such as the Mi strain. 
They may also measure range rate, as the GE 
Mod III does. The position data of the radar 
(azimuth, elevation, range, and/or range rate) 
are presented to a computer, which determines 
the missile's present position and IIP. These 
are presented directly to the Range Safety 
Officer by means of plots on range safety charts. 
(For some ETR launches, there is a secondary IIP 
plot presented to an intermediary Range Safety
Observer who ii. turn relays the data to the 
Range Safety Officer through voice communi­ 
cations. This, however, is impertinent to 
the discussion and understanding of the general 
range safety system.) The Range Safety Officer 
is in communication with the missile through the 
range safety transmitter. Figs, k and 5 show a 
simplified diagram of the range safety system.
Flight Termination
The question arises, how does the Range 
Safety Officer terminate flight? What control 
does he have and can he exercise? A description 
of either the ground or airborne flight termina­ 
tion system details are beyond the scope of this 
paper. Suffice it to say there is a coded trans­ 
mitter on the ground and a coded receiver in the 
missile. By transmitting the proper coded signals 
to the missile, Range Safety can terminate flight 
either manually or automatically, with manual the 
preferred means. Manual termination can be 
accomplished in either of two ways, viz., thrust 
termination through shutting down the engines 
(Manual Fuel Cutoff - MFCO), or destruct, with 
the former the preferred method. (At the ETR, the 
automatic cutoff was developed to shut off the 
sustainer engine only on Atlas, hence the acronym 
ASCO for "Automatic Sustainer Cutoff". This was 
necessary to protect Station 12 from a failure 
during the last few seconds of sustainer flight, 
since because of the high IIP velocity, it could 
not be done manually. It still permits the ver­ 
nier engines to burn allowing the major parts of 
the test objectives to be met. The IIP velocity 
during the vernier portion is sufficiently slow 
to permit manual control again. For certain 
types of missions, this sustainer only cutoff can 
be sent manually, and is then known by the acronym 
MASCO, for manual sustainer cutoff.)
Since not every failed missile will enhazard 
land, there must be some criterion established to 
distinguish between a hazardous and a non- 
hazardous failure. A non-hazardous failed missile 
may permit recovery of data valuable to the test 
program; therefore, from the range user's view­ 
point, the flight should continue as long as data 
can be recovered and until a definite hazard to 
land exists. This criterion takes the form of 
flight termination("destruct") lines on the range 
safety charts. To properly locate these lines, 
it is incumbent upon the range user to supply 
Range Safety with missile performance data. These 
data include the planned trajectory and the 
expected deviations therefrom (i.e., the 3~sigma 
maximum and minimum performance and lateral 
trajectories) in the form of position, velocity, 
accelerations, IIP locations, ground range, 
flight path angle, engine thrust and other tra­ 
jectory data specified by the range; turn 
capabilities of the missile in pitch and in yaw 
for trimmed and/or tumbling turns; the effects of 
a missile breakup from destruct action or from 
other causes; the impact locations of the various 
stages; and the dispersions of the impact locations,
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These are combined with instrumentation 
errors, wind effects, and allowance for 
computation delays (since smoothing tech­ 
niques are used) and human and electro­ 
mechanical (transmission, relays, valves, 
etc.) reaction times to locate the impact 
limit or flight termination lines on present 
position and IIP charts. Thus, when the 
present position or IIP plotters indicate a 
hazardous condition impends, the flight is 
terminated. Figures 6, 7> 8, and 9 are 
examples of range safety charts showing 
flight termination lines. Figure 9 shows a 
typical ASCO line as might be used on a long 
range ballistic missile flight.
The typical flight pictured in Figure 1 
shows the IIP crossing over land. Obviously, 
should a failure occur during the transit 
time of the IIP across the land (the "exposure" 
time), impact will occur and the range safety 
function of protection of life and property 
will have been compromised. In the event the 
flight plan cannot be changed without unduly 
jeopardizing the test objectives, it becomes 
necessary to request Range Safety to waive its 
restrictions to permit the flight to take place. 
The request to waive these restrictions must be 
documented, and the documentation must include 
why a waiver is requested, i.e., the effects 
upon the test objectives and program, and it must 
include an analysis of the risks to which the 
land and its inhabitants are exposed, i.e., the 
probability of impact and the estimated number of 
casualties as a result of an impact. We shall 
limit ourselves to the discussion of the evalua­ 
tion of the risks.
Hazard Evaluation
The hazard study attempts to determine 
quantitatively the risks involved in a flight 
which violates the normal range safety criterion. 
It does this by analyzing the types of failure 
which may lead to a hazard,and assigning a prob­ 
ability of occurrence to these. It seeks to 
determine what the probability of impact is should 
these failures in fact occur. (Reference 1 presents 
one method of determining the probability of impact.) 
It also attempts to estimate the number of 
casualties resulting from an impact. Approval 
of the flight is contingent upon acceptability of 
the risks by the range from economic, political, 
and humanitarian bases.
The types of failure which may occur are 
analyzed on the basis of their effects on range 
safety. These have been categorized into five 
general failure modes'. These are defined as:
a. A premature thrust termination (PIT) is 
defined as complete loss of thrust by the vehicle 
at any time prior to that required to reach the 
intended impact point or orbit. It may be caused 
by, among other reasons, failure of the engine, 
breakup of the stage, burn through of the case on
gu i dance-a solid propellant missile, early 
commanded shut down, etc.
b. A hard-over tumble (HOT) is defined as 
complete loss of control of the thrust vector in 
such a fashion that the engine nozzle (in the 
case of nozzle angular position control of the 
thrust vector) goes to its mechanical stops 
(i.e., "hard over", hence the term "hard-over 
tumble") due to some cuase as eccentricity of 
the nozzle axis - missile axis or other mis­ 
alignment of the thrust vector. Loss of control 
may occur through loss of hydraulic fluid, for 
instance, in an hydrau1ica1ly controlled nozzle 
control unit.
c. A gradual turn (GT) or instantaneous 
impact point turn (IIP turn) is defined as loss 
of thrust vector control such that the missile 
does not go into a hard-over tumble but retains 
some semblance of stability. The locus of IIP 
turns from the intended locus, and either may 
continue to turn, or may turn to a new azimuth 
and continue along that direction. It may be 
caused by partial loss of thrust vector control 
such that the nozzle deflects from its correct 
position and obtains a new null position which 
results in a constant or slowly changing moment 
on the missile, or from a reference axis re­ 
alignment in the guidance system such that a 
new orbital plane results.
d. A thrust termination failure (TTF) is 
defined as failure to terminate the thrust at 
the time that impact would occur at the intended 
impact point and excludes the premature thrust 
termination category. It may be occasioned by 
the computer issuing late or failing to issue 
the thrust termination command, by failure to 
release the thrust termination ports or operate 
the propellant valving, or by other causes.
e. A deviant missile (DM) or abnorma1 
mi ss ? le (AM) is defined as one which flies with­ 
out the 3-sigma limits of the intended flight 
path. That is, it exceeds the 3-sigma boundaries 
of the ground track of a nominal missile. It may 
be caused by deviant performance of the guidance 
or propulsion systems.
The factors contributing to these failure 
modes must be determined (unless one uses the 
maximum hazards concept), and the probability 
of occurrence of the failure mode evaluated. 
From the probability of occurrence, the prob­ 
ability of impact and the estimated number of 
casualties can be determined. To properly do so, 
an analysis of missile breakup under the 
conditions of intentional destruction during 
flight, unintentional destruction during flight, 
and reentry must be conducted; the survivabi1ity 
and dispersion of the pieces resulting from 
breakup must be calculated; and the lethal area 
obta ined.
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Before exemplifying a typical failure mode, 
the concept of miss coefficients will be 
introduced. The miss coefficients merely express 
the relationship between velocity perturbations 
or variations and the resulting change in the 
impact location. Figure 10 illustrates this 
pictorially and mathematically in the form of 
matrices. For small perturbations in velocity 
near the nominal burnout conditions, the approxi­ 
mation matrix is generally satisfactory. The 
coefficients are usually generated by using the 
nominal velocity vector and impact location as 
starting points. The coordinate systems can be 
chosen such that AVX is in the direction of the 
velocity vector, A^z ' s perpendicular to &\lx and 
lies in the vertical plane containing Vx and A^y 
is perpendicular to both AVX and A^Z' The 
direction of DR is usually chosen as an extension 
of the arc of the great circle connecting the 
launch point with the target, and the direction 
of CR is along the great circle perpendicular to 
DR at the target. By perturbing the velocity 
vector along one of the three directions at a 
time and determining the change in impact location, 
the effect of incremental velocity changes in each 
of the three directions on the downrange and cross- 
range directions can be ascertained.
The mode of failure chosen exempli gratia is 
the hard-over tumble. The HOT can, of course, 
occur in any plane. Since the largest area is 
enhazarded when the HOT occurs in yaw only, a 
yaw-only HOT is usually the one considered. 
(The effects of a HOT in pitch only are similar, 
from a range safety standpoint, to a PTT, except 
that the IIP locus oscillates upon itself.) The 
dynamics and equations involved in a HOT are 
shown in Figure 11, and the resulting angular 
deflection of the velocity vector is shown in 
Figure 12. (Figure 12 shows only the typical 
curve for a maximum engine deflection. Similar 
curves are also generated for other, smaller, 
constant engine deflections, and these curves 
have increasingly greater maximum amplitudes and 
lower frequencies of oscillation with decreasing 
engine deflection angles. The envelope of these 
turns define the limits of the velocity vector 
turn capability of the missile and therefore the 
maximum lateral deviation of the IIP from the 
nominal.) The incremental velocities in the 
direction of the initial velocity vector define 
a Cornu spiral, as shown in Figure 13. Conse­ 
quently, the IIP describes a Cornu spiral upon 
the surface of the earth. Because the sensi­ 
tivity of the IIP to velocity changes is greater 
in the downrange than in the crossrange direction 
(the ratio depending upon when in flight the 
failure occurs), the IIP spiral is distorted as 
shown in Figure 13« From a series of tumble 
turn graphs like Figure 12, varying only in the 
time the failure is assumed to start, a tumble 
corridor can be calculated which defines the 
limits of crossrange excursion of the IIP as a 
result of a HOT at any time during .powered 
flight, and impact as a result of a HOT will 
occur within the extremes established by the 
crossrange and downrange excursions of the IIP,
if the missile remains intact.
The question of missile integrity during a 
HOT must be examined next. If the missile is 
endoatmospheric at the time of failure, aero­ 
dynamic loads will most probably predominate, and 
cause the resultant breakup when and if it occurs. 
If the missile is exoatmospheric, the inertial 
loads are predominant, and the resulting breakup 
may differ from that resulting from aerodynamic 
loading. The method of breakup must be examined, 
to determine whether incremental velocities are 
added to the pieces from alleviation of tank 
pressures or from the resulting propellant burn­ 
ing, and if there are, the magnitudes of the 
velocities. This means that the amounts and 
characteristics of the propellants must be known. 
From the incremental velocities and drag and miss 
coefficients, the resulting dispersions of pieces 
can be determined.
Before this is done, however, the surviv- 
ability of the pieces must be determined. To 
properly do so, the thermal characteristics of 
the piece and heat loads the piece is subjected 
to must be known. Experience has shown that the 
greater number of pieces will survive the reentry 
environment. This includes such things as pieces 
of missile skin. The protection afforded some 
parts of the pieces entering by the leading face 
of the piece contributes to the survivabi1ity. 
Heat capacity, heat transmission, and heat 
radiation are among the things which must be 
taken into account in the study on the survival 
of pieces.
As a prerequisite for estimating the number « 
of casualties, the lethal area must be determined. 
The lethal area is defined as that area surround­ 
ing the impact location of a piece which, if 
occupied by a human being, will result in death 
or injury of that person. It has been customary 
to assume total exposure in that area; i.e., no 
allowance has been made for possible complete or 
partial protection of the inhabitant of the area 
(by trees, houses, etc.)? nor has the terrain 
(sandy, mountainous, rocky, loam, clay, etc.) 
been considered. For a conservative estimate, 
this is the better approach, since it tends to put 
an upper bound upon the estimated casualties. It 
may in the future be advisable to account for the 
probability of complete or partial protection, 
and for the terrain, although the terrain affects 
the distribution of population throughout the 
world. For instance, mountainous and desert 
regions are usually more sparsely populated than 
are fertile plains, coastal areas, and navigable 
waters. The type of terrain may already be com­ 
pensated for by the natural population distri­ 
bution.
After determining the probability of 
occurrence of a failure mode and the survivabi1ity 
of a piece, the probability of impact of one or 
more pieces upon any land area can be calculated. 
Knowing the probability of impact, the lethal 
area, and the population distribution within the
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land area under consideration, the 
estimated number of casualties can be 
computed. Having these data, the range 
is then in a position to weigh the risk 
involved in the launch against the 
objectives to be gained from the flight, 
and may waive or not waive the range safety 
requirements dependent upon the evaluation 
presented to it.
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